

Message Text

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03083 01 OF 02 221858Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-07 AF-08 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-09 EUR-12 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-02

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-02 PRS-01

OES-06 SS-15 USIA-15 SAJ-01 NRC-07 /154 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9487

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3083

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM CCD

SUBJECT: CCD-U.S. STATEMENT ON CTB AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMB MARTIN'S PLENARY STATEMENT ON CTB
AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, APRIL 22: BEGIN TEXT

IN MY STATEMENT TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, THE SUBJECT WE ARE PRESENTLY CONSIDERING IN
INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS. MY GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS
SUBJECT

CAN BE SUMMARIZED QUITE BRIEFLY. IN THE ABSENCE OF A RELIABLE,
MUTUAL PROHIBITION, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM SERVES

AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR
NUCLEAR DETERRENT. HOWEVER, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES
HAVE STATED ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASSIONS, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
GIVE UP WHATEVER BENEFITS EXIT IN CONTINUED TESTING IF THIS WERE
DONE PURSUANT TO AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDED
REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT OTHERPARTIES TO THE AGREEMTN WERE ALSO
GIVING UP THOSE BENEFITS. INABILITY TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTAN-
ING ON VERIFICATION MEASURES CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUCH CONFIDENCE
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03083 01 OF 02 221858Z

HAS, IN OUR VIEW, BEEN THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY A CTB HAS
REMAINED BYOND OUR GRASP.

THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SEISMIC MONITORING WOULD BE ONE OF

THE ESSENTIAL MEANS OF PROVIDING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH A CTB. FOR THIS REASON, MY GOVERNMENT HAS EXPENDED SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES AND EFFORT TO IMPROVING SEISMIC VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES. CCD/491, WHICH MY DELEGATION IS FORMALLY INTRODUCING TODAY AND WHICH WAS OUTLINED TO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE DURING OUR INFORMAL MEETINGS, REVIEWS RECENT PROGRESS MADE IN SEISMIC VERIFICATION RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE WORKING PAPER DESCRIBES THE DEVELOPMENT AND INSTALLATION OF NEW SEISMIC SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE PROJECTED 13-STATION SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORY NETWORK, WHICH WILL ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR EXISTING DATA SOURCES. CONCURRENTLY, WE ARE DEVELOPING A SOPHISTICATED DATA-PROCESSING FACILITY, LOCATED IN ALEXANDRIA, WHICH WE EXPECT WILL ENABLE A LARGE VOLUME OF DATA FROM MANY SOURCES TO BE APPLIED EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO SEISMIC RESEARCH PROBLEMS.

THE WORKING PAPER ALSO REPORTS ON SOME ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS FROM OUR RESEARCH EFFORTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT DESCRIBES A NEW TECHNIQUE THAT COULD IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ANOMALOUS EVENT PROBLEM. THIS TECHNIQUE APPEARS PROMISING BUT REQUIRES FURTHER EVALUATION. ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT MENTIONED IN THE PAPER IS THE COMPLETION OF A MODEL STUDY OF EVASION PROBLEMS. THIS STUDY INDICATED THAT A WELL-SITED NETWORK OF SINGLE STATIONS WITHIN A GIVEN LAND MASS COULD, WITHIN THAT AREA, REDUCE BY A FULL ORDER OF MAGNITUDE THE YIELD AT WHICH AN EVADER COULD BE CONFIDENT OF ESCAPING DETECTION. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW DATA RESOURCES AND THESE NEW ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES TO THE PRINCIPAL REMAINING PROBLEMS OF SEISMIC MONITORING WILL RESULT IN A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN SEISMIC VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES.

HOWEVER, THE RESULTS OF SEVERAL COMPREHENSIVE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION STUDIES, WHICH WERE REPORTED IN THE WORKING PAPER, INDICATE THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT REMAINING LIMITATIONS OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION.

THESE RESULTS WERE CONFIRMED BY THE PRESENTATIONS OF EXPERTS FROM SEVERAL DELEGATIONS DURING OUR INFORMAL MEETINGS. BECAUSE OF THESE LIMITATIONS, WE DO NOT PRESENTLY FORESEE HOW A CTB VERIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03083 01 OF 02 221858Z

SYSTEM BASED SOLELY ON TELESEISMIC MEANS COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT A PARTY WAS NOT CONDUCTING A CLandestine TESTING PROGRAM OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WERE EXPRESSED BY THE EXPERTS THIS WEEK ON THE SEISMIC MAGNITUDE LEVEL AT WHICH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS COULD BE DETECTED AND IDENTIFIED WITH CONFIDENCE. HOWEVER, THERE WAS LITTLE DISAGREEMENT THAT, BELOW SOME LEVEL, THE VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES WERE EXCEEDINGLY LIMITED. SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE NONETHELESS STATED THAT ANY CLANDISTINE TESTING THAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE UNDER A CTB WOULD NOT BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS CONCLUSION. IT IS NOTEWORTHY, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS DURING THE

LAST FEW YEARS HAVE HAD EXPLOSIVE YIELDS OF LESS THAN 20 KILOTONS. TESTS AS THESE LOWER YIELDS COULD PROVIDE MUCH FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION USEFUL BOTH FOR TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE EFFECTS OF A TESTING PROGRAM CARRIED OUT AT YIELDS THAT MIGHT NOT BE IDENTIFIED BY TELESEISMIC MEANS COULD INDEED HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY VALUE.

SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE CLAIMED THAT NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OTHER THAN SEISMIC MONITORING COULD FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF A CTB. WE WOULD AGREE THAT OTHER METHODS OF REMOTE MONITORING COULD, IN PRINCIPLE, CONTRIBUTE TO CTB VERIFICATION. HOWEVER, THE VALUE OF SUCH METHODS SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED, SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE INHERENT PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, A DETERMINED EVADER MIGHT BE ABLE TO DISGUISE OR AVOID THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TESTING THAT SUCH METHODS WERE INTENDED TO DETECT.

IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING LIMITATIONS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF A CTB CONTINUES TO REQUIRE SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN MANY COUNTRIES, ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD BE THE ONLY MEANS OF PROVIDING CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE--FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH SAMPLING FOR RADIOACTIVITY--THAT A DETECTED SEISMIC EVENT WAS A

NUCLEAR EXPLOSION RATHER THAN AN EARTHQUAKE OR A CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSION. THUS, A VERIFICATION SYSTEM THAT INCLUDED ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD PROVIDE NOT ONLY A SUBSTANTIAL DETERRENT TO CLandestine TESTING BY INCREASING THE RISKS THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 GENEVA 03083 01 OF 02 221858Z

VIOLATION WOULD BE DISCOVERED, BUT ALSO A MEANS OF ASSURING CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY REGIME IN THOSE CASES WHERE SEISMIC METHODS MAY HAVE MISIDENTIFIED EARTHQUAKES AS EXPLOSIONS OR PRESENTED AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE NATURE OF A SEISMIC EVENT.

UNMANNED SEISMIC OBSERVATORIES, SOMETIMES CALLED "BLACK BOXES", HAVE ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED AS A MEANS OF VERIFYING A CTB. THE U.S. COULD LOWER THE THRESHOLD MAGNITUDE FOR DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION, IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY TO LOCATE EVENTS, AND THEREBY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETERRENCE TO A VIOLATION. HOWEVER, THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT A SEISMIC EVENT WAS A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THUS, THE U.S. COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO SEISMIC VERIFICATION OF A CTB, BUT THEY ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF, AND SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, ON-SITE INSPECTION. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT FURTHER EFFORT BE DEVOTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAMPER-PROOF, RELIABLE, LOW MAINTENANCE U.S. INVOLVING MINIMUM INTRUSIVENESS, AND ALSO TO EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF SUCH INSTRUMENTS TO A CTB VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

THE U.S. CONTINUES TO REGARD INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC COOPERATION AS A PROMISING COMPONENT OF A CTB VERIFICATION SYSTEM. WE HAVE IN

THE PAST MADE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF SEISMIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE INTERNATIONALLY IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO MONITORING A CTB. IN LIGHT OF THESE EFFORTS, WE SUPPORT THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL THAT AN AD HOC GROUP OF EXPERTS BE ESTABLISHED TO EXAMINE THE CONTRIBUTION THAT INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC COOPERATION COULD MAKE TO THE DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMIC EVENTS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROJECT--WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR UNDERTAKING FOR THE COMMITTEE--SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONCEIVED AND THAT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY FORMULATED. IN PARTICULAR, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE GROUP'S RESPONSIBILITIES ARE TECHNICAL IN NATURE. THUS, WE FEEL THAT IT SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS THAT WOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY BE MADE BY GOVERNMENTS--SUCH AS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUANCY OF A GIVEN SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM FOR VERIFYING A CTB. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THE STUDY SHOULD BE CONFINED STRICTLY TO SEISMIC MEANS OF MONITORING. WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND, WE WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE FORMAL PROPOSAL MADE BY AMBASSADOR HAMILTON THIS MORNING. WE LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSIONS EARLY IN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 GENEVA 03083 01 OF 02 221858Z

THE SUMMER AIMED AT REACHING BROAD AGREEMENT ON ACCEPTABLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE STUDY. RECENTLY IT HAS BECOME WIDELY RECOGNIZED THAT THAT PROBLEM OF CLANDESTINE WEAPON TESTING IS NOT THE ONLY CTB VERIFICATION ISSUE STILL UNRESOLVED. THERE IS, IN ADDITION, THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER, UNDER A CTB, AN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03083 02 OF 02 221902Z

42
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-07 AF-08 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-09 EUR-12 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-02

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-02 PRS-01

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 3083

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ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR PNES CAN BE WORKED OUT. IN CCD/456, MY GOVERNMENT TOOK THE VIEW THAT, IF PNES WERE TO BE ACCOMMODATED UNDER A CTB, A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DEvised THAT WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS WERE NOT BEING ACQUIRED FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT OSTENSIBLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE, A CONTROL SYSTEM, AT A MINIMUM, WOULD HAVE TO PREVENT THE TESTING OF A NEW WEAPON CONCEPT, THE SUBSTITUTION OF A STOCKPILED WEAPON FOR THE "PNE" EXPLOSIVE TO VERIFY ITS PERFORMANCE, AND THE CARRYING OUT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS STUDIES.

IN CCD/481, THE DELEGATION OF SWEDEN MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF PNE ACCOMMODATION BY EXPERT OBSERVATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION. THEY DISCUSSED TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM.

"ONE POSSIBILITY COULD BE TO MONITOR THE COMPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS PRODUCED AT THE EXPLOSION SITE. THEREBY ONE COULD CHECK THAT NUCLEAR DEVICES OF WELL-KNOWN DESIGN WERE NOT REPLACED BY GROSSLY DIFFERENT CONSTRUCTIONS. ANOTHER, AND IN OUR VIEW QUITE EFFECTIVE, WAY WOULD BE TO MAKE SURE, BY EXPERT UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03083 02 OF 02 221902Z

INSPECTION, THAT THE EXPLOSIONS ARE NOT USED FOR WHAT IS CALLED DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS OF THE EXPLOSION ITSELF IN ITS VERY EARLY STAGES. IN THIS WAY IT COULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE POSSIBLE TO REDUCE ANY WEAPON DEVELOPMENT ADVANTAGES TO A MINIMUM."

MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT AGREE THAT THE TWO APPROACHES SUGGESTED BY SWEDEN WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF ACHIEVING ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT WEAPONS RELATED BENEFITS WERE NOT BEING DERIVED FROM PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS. EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE-- BY RADIO-CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OR ANY OTHER MEANS-- THAT THE DEVICE USED WAS OF A "WELL-KNOWN DESIGN," THIS WOULD PROVIDE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE EXPLOSION WAS NOT CONTRIBUTING USEFUL INFORMATION TO A WEAPONS PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, DETAILED DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR DERIVING IMPORTANT WEAPONS RELATED INFORMATION.

FURTHER CONSIDERATION IS NEEDED OF THE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX QUESTION OF WHETHER, UNDER A CTB, AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED ACCOMMODATION FOR PNES CAN BE ACHIEVED. NO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM HAS YET BEEN FOUND.

A QUESTION THAT HAS RECENTLY SURFACED AS A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE IN CTB DISCUSSIONS IS WHETHER THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, OR ALL NUCLEAR TESTING POWERS, WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE A CTB COULD ENTER INTO FORCE. IN LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING, THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN

CONSIDERING ANY CTB PROPOSAL. AMONG THE FACTORS THAT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ARRIVING AT A POSITION ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE A TESTING STATE'S PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND TESTING EXPERIENCE RELATIVE TO THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND TESTING EXPERIENCE OF OTHER TESTING POWERS. HOWEVER, WE QUESTION THE DESIRABILITY AND TIMELINESS OF TAKING A POSITION ON THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE IN THE ABSTRACT, BEFORE RESOLVING THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS HOLDING UP A CTB-- NAMELY, VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING PNES. ONCE THEY ARE RESOLVED, SEVERAL OPTIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE. THESE INCLUDE: AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS, A LIMITED DURATION AGREEMENT NOT REQUIRING ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR REVIEW AND EXTENSION, AND AN UNLIMITED DURATION AGREEMENT NOT UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 GENEVA 03083 02 OF 02 221902Z

REQUIRING ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS BUT CONTAINING A PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE EVENT THAT TREATY PARTIES CONSIDERED THEIR SUPREME INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED. FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT MADE A DETERMINATION WHETHER A CTB SHOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS BEFORE IT COULD ENTER INTO FORCE.

DURING THE MAJOR PORTION OF THIS WEEK THE COMMITTEE HAS CONSIDERED, IN THE WORDS OF THE SPONSORS OF THE INFORMAL MEETINGS, THE "REMAINING OBSTACLES TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AGREEMENT." I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MY DISCUSSION OF THE TEST BAN ISSUE WITH A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR TESTING RESTRAINTS THAT, IN THE FACE OF THESE REMAINING OBSTACLES, THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION AGREED TO ADOPT AS A PRACTICAL STEP TOWARD THE CTB OBJECTIVE. I AM REFERRING, OF COURSE, TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND ITS ASSOCIATED AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

AS MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE ARE AWARE, THE TTBT, WHICH WAS SIGNED IN MOSCOW IN JULY 1974, BANS UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WITH A YIELD EXCEEDING 150 KILOTONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE III OF THAT TREATY, THE US AND USSR BEGAN NEGOTIATIONS IN OCTOBER 1974 ON A SEPARATE AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MY GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT BECAUSE OF THE INTEGRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE VERIFICATION OF A THRESHOLD ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND THE CONDUCT OF PNES, WE WOULD NOT PRESENT THE TTBT TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION UNTIL A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED.

I CAN NOW REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE THAT THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS HAVE CONCLUDED THEIR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT AN AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT IS BEING REVIEWED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WILL BE FORMALLY APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENTS SHORTLY AND THAT THE TWO AGREE-

MENTS WILL BE RATIFIED AND WILL ENTER INTO FORCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT A FULL REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE DURING THE SUMMER SESSION ON THE CONTENTS OF THE PNE AGREEMENT, ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE TTBT, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TTBT/PNE REGIME FOR OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING FURTHER UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 GENEVA 03083 02 OF 02 221902Z

NUCLEAR TESTING RESTRAINTS.

BEFORE LEAVING THE TEST BAN ISSUE, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DELEGATION'S APPRECIATION TO THE SWEDISH DELEGATION, WHICH TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO HOLD THE CURRENT SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS, AND TO ALL THE EXPERTS WHO HAVE HELPED MAKE THOSE MEETINGS A MOST CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR SPRING SESSION.

IN CONCLUDING THIS INTERVENTION, I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT. DURING THE SPRING SESSION, CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION WAS DEVOTED TO THE QUESTION OF THE COMMITTEE'S PROCEDURES. INFORMAL MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT, IF ONLY ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS, ON TWO IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION OF THE CCD. INABILITY, SO FAR, TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS ON AN ADDITIONAL ITEM UNDER DISCUSSION HAS PREVENTED THE COMMITTEE FROM TAKING A FORMAL DECISION ON THESE MATTERS, AND IT APPEARS AT THIS TIME THAT CONSIDERATION OF THESE THREE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE START OF OUR SUMMER SESSION.

WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO PUT THESE PROVISIONAL DECISIONS BEHIND US BEFORE THE RECESS, WE SEE NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE CURRENT STATUS OF OUR CONSIDERATION OF PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. AFTER ALL, CHANGES IN PROCEDURES, EVEN THOSE THAT MAY APPEAR QUITE MINOR, MAY NONETHELESS HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE. THEY THEREFORE DESERVE CAREFUL AND DETAILED SCRUTINY, AND THEY MUST BE BASED ON A TRUE CONSENSUS OF THE CCD'S MEMBERS. IF WE CAN CONTINUE TO APPROACH THESE MATTERS IN THE SAME CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT THAT ALL DELEGATIONS HAVE DISPLAYED TO DATE, I AM CERTAIN THAT WE CAN SOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES EARLY IN THE SUMMER SESSION, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY, AS A PACKAGE, OR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROCEDURAL REVIEW. THIS SHOULD GIVE US TIME TO MAKE ANY ADJUSTMENTS IN PROCEDURES, SUCH AS REGARDING PREPARATION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT, WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH THE SMOOTH OPERATION OF THE COMMITTEE.

I WOULD SUGGEST THAT ONE ITEM BE GIVEN PRIORITY WHEN WE RE-CONVENE IN JUNE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH AN INFORMAL WORKING UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 GENEVA 03083 02 OF 02 221902Z

BODY TO FACILITATE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON ENVIRONMENTAL WAREFARE. MY DELEGATION SHARES THIS VIEW. WHATEVER SUCH A BODY IS CALLED, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE OPENING DAYS, IF NOT THE OPENING HOURS, OF OUR SUMMER SESSION. IN OUR VIEW, IT SHOULD HAVE A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP, IT SHOULD ENJOY THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SECRETARIAT, IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO REQUEST THE PREPARATION OF WHATEVER RECORDS ARE DEEMED ADVISABLE, AND IT SHOULD ISSUE WHATEVER REPORTS ARE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. WE FURTHER BELIEVE IT SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE WORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROCEDURAL REVIEW-- TO WHICH MY DELEGATION LOOKS FORWARD.

FINALLY, I CAN UNEQUIVOCALLY SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST INTERESTING HARD-WORKING AND PRODUCTIVE CCD SESSION THAT I HAVE ATTENDED. I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO ALL OF MY COLLEAGUES FOR THEIR COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH HAS MADE THIS POSSIBLE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK AMBASSADOR HYVARINEN AND THE SECRETARIAT FOR ALL THEIR EXCELLENT WORK, AND IN PARTICULAR MENTION MR. CORRADINI, MRS. GILL AND THE INTERPRETERS WHO PUT UP WITH SO MUCH IN OUR UNSTRUCTURED INFORMAL MEETINGS. DALE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CTB, DISARMAMENT, MEETINGS, CONSULTANTS, SPEECHES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976GENEVA03083
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760153-0152
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197604115/baaaeseh.tel
Line Count: 402
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchant0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 AUG 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 AUG 2004 by cookms>; APPROVED <16 DEC 2004 by buchant0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CCD-U.S. STATEMENT ON CTB AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS
TAGS: PARM, US, CCD, (MARTIN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006